Entry, exit and mergers: a competitive equilibrium model with financial frictions by Fossati, Román
Entry, Exit and Mergers: A Competitive
Equilibrium Model with Financial Frictions.¤
Román Fossatiy
Department of Economics, UNLP
November 15, 2005
Abstract
This paper examines a dynamic stochastic model of a competi-
tive industry with heterogeneous …rms that allows for entry, exit and
mergers of …rms in equilibrium. The model we build is an extension
of a modi…ed version of Jovanovic and Rousseau’s (2002) model that
introduces …nancial frictions, describes the market for corporate con-
trol and endogenizes its equilibrium price, and develops a stationary
equilibrium à la Hopenhayn (1992). It provides a theoretical frame-
work within which to study factors a¤ecting variables such as entry,
exit and investment through direct unbundled capital good purchase
and mergers. This work contributes to the literature by suggesting an-
other explanation to many empirical regularities and describing one
more mechanism through which aggregate liquidity shocks may a¤ect
merger activity. The results suggest that due to asymmetric infor-
mation about entrepreneur’s survival probabilities aggregate liquidity
shocks may contribute to codetermine the turnover rate of …rms and
investment levels through mergers.
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Mergers are a means by which capital  (physical or human) finds
its highest valued use. As an industry ages, some firms will grow
and acquire capital, and others will die.The financial mechanisms
used to accomplish this will depend on the type of industry,and the
challenge for future work is to explain why a particular vehicle  for
capital reallocations used in a particular circumstance. 
(Gort and Klepper, 1982).
1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs typically have no means to fund their projects, and they
must …nance greater amounts than incumbents.1 According to empirical
evidence, entrepreneurs bear substantial risk. New entrants are smaller (the
size of new …rms is between 40% and 60% of the size of incumbents), exhibit
lower survival rates (between 20% and 40% of new …rms fail during the
…rst two years and only 40%-50% of entering …rms survive more than seven
years), and have also greater variance in their growth rate.2 The high rate of
infant mortality represents great uncertainty about entrepreneur’s quality.
Young …rms come to …nancial markets as unknown entities. Then, expensive
loans are granted to new …rms because of asymmetric information about
…rms’ survival probabilities.3 As entrepreneurs take on more debt and the
cost of capital is higher for entrants than for incumbents, initial capital
requirements may constitute a big component in the cost of entry to an
industry.
On the other hand, models of industry dynamics suggest a negative re-
lation between sunk entry costs and …rms’ turnover rate.4 In particular, we
rely on the Hopenhayn’s (1992) paper that develops a model which endoge-
nously determines entry and exit of …rms. It considers that as a consequence
of idiosyncratic uncertainty substantial amounts of resources are reallocated
across …rms, from contracting and exiting ones to new and expanding ones.
In reality, exit can take place through either failure or acquisition, while
…rm’s productive capacity expansion can take place through either direct
purchase of new capital goods or mergers. Empirical evidence on aggregate
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, and entry and exit of …rms in the
U.S. economy reported a positive correlation between horizontal mergers
and the turnover rate of …rms. More speci…cally, according to empirical
1 Cooley and Quadrini (1998) present empirical evidence that small and younger …rms
take on more debt.
2 These stylized facts has emerged from a number of empirical studies. See Caves (1998),
Sutton (1997), and Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989a,b).
3 Wynne (2005).
4 We review the relevant literature on dynamic industry equilibrium in the next section.
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regularities documented in the literature, entry leads mergers. In addition,
it have been documented an increase in merger activity and a change in …rms’
investment composition over time: during the past two decades mergers and
acquisitions have grown relative to direct investment in (unbundled) capital
goods.5
Based on these facts, we suggests that mergers and processes of entry
and exit are codetermined. Then, determinants of the turnover rate of busi-
ness may also a¤ect mergers. The interaction between these variables has
attracted the attention of researchers, and some explanations have been pro-
vided to shed light on this issue. In addition, a relevant aspect illustrated by
Caves (1998) is that productivity growth for an industry as a whole depends
to an important degree on the redistribution of shares toward more produc-
tive units and not just on growth of the units’ individual productivity. As
mergers play the same economic role as entry and exit (asset reallocation)6
it seems natural then to study these processes within a uni…ed framework.
We develop a theoretical framework within which to study factors a¤ect-
ing variables such as entry, exit and investment through direct unbundled
capital good purchase and mergers. The model we build is an extension of a
modi…ed version of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) model that introduces …-
nancial frictions, describes the market for corporate control and endogenizes
its equilibrium price, and develops a stationary equilibrium à la Hopenhayn
(1992). The model replicates many empirical regularities documented in
the literature and o¤er an alternative explanation to the increase in merger
activity and to the change in the composition of investment evidenced in
the past two decades.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Sec-
tion 3 describes the model. Section 4 characterizes the stationary equilib-
rium and exposes the description of the market for corporate control. In
Section 5 the comparative static exercises we are looking for are presented.
Section 6 provides the …nal remarks.
2 Literature.
In this section …rst we review the relevant literature on dynamic industry
equilibrium7, and we then review the work on mergers.
5 Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001, 2002a).
6 Manne (1965).
7 For a more detailed discussion on …rm and industry dynamics see Caves (1998), Sutton
(1997), Dune Roberts and Samuelson (1989a,b) and Lambson and Jensen (1995).
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The emerging theoretical literature on industry dynamics has contributed
to the analysis of the observed heterogeneity across individual producers.
These theoretical models of industry dynamics include passive learning mod-
els that are the primary models that emphasize learning and persistent pro-
ductivity shocks (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992); and active learning
models that focus on research and development sources of industry evolution
(Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Pakes and Ericson 1998).
In Jovanovic’s (1982) model entrepreneurs are uncertain about …rms’
productivity. As …rms produce they acquire noisy information concerning
their e¢ciency. Those who receive systematically negative signals about
their productivity exit the industry. Hopenhayn (1992) construct a model
where …rms receive an idiosyncratic shock each period which then leads them
to make a decision about whether to exit or stay in the industry. He provides
a characterization and an analysis of the equilibrium steady state. Ericson
and Pakes (1998) developed a model where …rm e¢ciency is a stochastic
function of the level of investment in research and development. Firms that
experience bad luck in their research fall behind the others and are scrapped.
Pakes and Ericson (1998) studied the empirical implications of passive
and active learning models in great depth and suggest that the passive learn-
ing model …ts the retail sector well, while manufacturing shows patterns that
suggest active learning models. All these formulations emphasize the role
of …rm speci…c factors such as age and size as determinants of …rms failure.
It is also suggested that industry characteristics (such as sunk costs) are
relevant in determining mobility and exit outcomes of …rms as well as the
size distribution of …rms.8 Klepper (1996) and Asplund and Nocke (2003)
also emphasize the position of the industry on the industry-life cycle and
the role of market size.9
Work on acquisitions shows that mergers have been the subject of keen
interest in an important theoretical and empirical literature. It is often
thought that mergers are alternative forms of investment and are commonly
used to enter new product or geographic areas, to reallocate assets into the
control of the most e¤ective managers/owners and to obtain new knowledge
or skills.10 Gort’s (1969) work focus on the impact of technological shocks
on dispersion in valuations and the implications on mergers. He states that
mergers are more likely to take place among …rms with a higher technical
to non technical personnel ratio. Similarly Telser (1987) …nds that mergers
8 See also Lambson (1995 and 1998).
9 For a more detailed literature on empirical and theoretical industrial organization see
Caves (1998), Sutton (1997), and Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989a,b).
10 See Pautler (2001).
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were more intense in rapidly growing industries. In addition, mergers are
more likely to involve a target in an industry that shows rapid technological
change, or a target in a growing industry and an acquirer in a declining
one and hence to lead capital to ‡ow faster from declining to expanding
sectors. Gort, Grabowski y McGunkin (1985) argue that the indivisibility
of management teams creates economics of scope and then companies may
try to take over another company and manage it in order to get rid of excess
management teams. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) propose that merger waves
are driven by liquidity which allows the re-assignment of capital among
owners to proceed more smoothly.
Manne (1965) argued that mergers are a means by which well performed
…rms get the badly managed assets of under performing (targets) …rms. In
addition he argued that mergers play the same economic role as entry and
exit (asset reallocation). Empirical evidence support this idea and suggest
that merger transactions involve high market-to-book acquirers purchasing
low market-to-book targets.11 It is also an extension of Tobin’s Q the-
ory of investment, where more pro…table …rms (high-Q …rms) should invest
by buying the less e¢cient …rms (low-Q …rms). Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2001a; 2002 a, b) develop a dynamic model and verify empirically that
when Q-dispersion is high merger activity increases. They also show that
reallocations of assets among …rms by mergers are more likely to occur than
purchases of new capital when …rms require large capital expansions because
of the …xed costs associated with entering the merger market. They discuss
why antitrust, regulation policies and globalization (mergers that involve
foreign …rms) cannot explain the increase in merger activity in the past two
decades. They also suggest that …xed costs associated with entering the
merger market have also been falling over time.
Though theoretical and empirical models have been proposed to analyze
entry and exit issues and large literature have been generated on mergers,
there has been relatively little analysis of these processes within a uni…ed
framework. Peel and Wilson (1989) argue that the acquisition of a distressed
…rm should be modeled as a distinct alternative to corporate failure.12 Dis-
ney et al. (2003) observe that about two-thirds of new entrants exit within
…ve years and approximately half of these are takeovers by other companies
under the same ownership groups. Bhattacharjee et al. (2004) present an
econometric model in order to analyze how processes that determine bank-
ruptcies and acquisitions depend on macroeconomic environment, and show
11 See Andrade and Sta¤ord (2002).
12 See also Shary (1991).
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that adverse macroeconomic conditions both increase bankruptcies hazard
while at the same time decreasing acquisition hazard.
3 Model.
In this section we extend the Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a) model in
order to take into account …nancial frictions and to present a more detailed
description and analysis of the market for corporate control endogenizing its
equilibrium price. In addition, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of
the model as developed by Hopenhayn (1992a).
There exists an industry with a continuum of …rms that produce a ho-
mogeneous good. The aggregate demand for goods is given by the inverse
demand function Pt = D(Yt), assumed to be continuous and strictly de-
creasing, where Yt is the industry output at period t. Firms can accumulate
capital (K 2 B ´ [0; k]) either buying new machines and equipment (direct
investment in unbundled capital goods, denoted as U) at a price of unity,
or they can invest through mergers and acquisitions (M) acquiring capi-
tal goods at a price q. The unbundled capital good supply price is …xed
and there is an endogenous inelastic supply of assembled capital (target
…rms) as we show later.13 Firms production function is given by y = zK.
Variable z 2 R0+ is an idiosyncratic shock that represents the technology
of the …rm that follows the same Markov process for each incumbent …rm,
Prfzt+1 · z0=zt = zg = F (z 0; z).
Before the new shock is realized incumbent …rms may exit the industry
getting a value s per unit of capital (a scrap value which represents a positive
opportunity cost), and then new …rms may enter the industry. An entering
…rm must pay an entry cost Ce ¸ 0: Then, shocks are revealed depending on
incumbents and entrants’ conditional distribution function F(¢) and initial
distribution function G(¢) respectively. All potential entrants face the same
prospects before entry. Then, we denote Ke as the level of capital require-
ments upon entry (Ke is the optimal scale of entrants). If entrants decide
to stay in the industry, shocks will evolve according to F (¢):
After shocks are revealed price and aggregate production are determined
competitively to equate demand and supply. The equilibrium price depend
on the quantity of …rms producing in the industry and the level of shocks
and capital …rms show in each period.
We consider a discrete representation of the shocks:
13 This assumption let us, in contrast with Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a), distinguish
what …rms are acquired and what …rms are dissolved.
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Assumption 1. Productivity levels z lie on a …nite set of points S; z 2
S ´ fz1; z2; :::; zng: The vector of initial probabilities is g and the transition
matrix of zt is T; where z1 < z2 < ::: < zn, and z1 = 0 is an absorbing
state:
T =
0BBBBBB@
¸n 0 0 : 0 1 ¡¸n
0 ¸n¡1 0 : 0 1 ¡ ¸n¡1
: : : : : :
: : : : : :
0 : : 0 ¸2 1 ¡ ¸2
0 : : 0 0 1
1CCCCCCA ; g =
0BBBBBB@
gn
gn¡1
:
:
g2
g1
1CCCCCCA
where 1 ¸ ¸i ¸ 0; ¸j+1 > j¸ ; j ¸ 2
and 1 ¸ gi ¸ 0; gi > gi+1; j¸ > gj; j ¸ 2
with i = 1;2; :::;n:
To clarify, the element ¸n of the …rst column corresponds to the transi-
tion probability F(zt+1 = zn=zt = zn) and the element 1¡¸n corresponds to
F(zt+1 = z
1=zt = z
n). Then, there is a (…rst order) stochastic dominance of
F(:) relative to G(:) and z is positively autocorrelated. These assumptions
will help to determine that expected discounted pro…ts are an increasing
function of current shock z. Matrix T also implies that the life span of a
…rm is …nite.14
Furthermore, from direct inspection of transition matrix T assumed, we
get some empirical regularities expressed in the next proposition:
Proposition 1 (i) The probability of survival (¸ i) is increasing with the
initial shock ;(ii) the share of high z-…rms is increasing in the age of a …rm
cohort and (iii) there is a skewed distribution of …rm sizes (many small …rms
and a few large …rms).15
The pair (z; K) is the type of a …rm, and the set consisting of all possible
such pairs is Z £B = fz1; z2; :::; zng £ [0; k]: Let A be a set of Borel subsets
on Z £ B. The total mass of …rms in period t is de…ned by Nt = ¡t(A);
where for any Borel set A ½ A; ¡t(A) is the measure of …rms with shocks
and capital levels in A.
14 These stochastic features of the shocks are consistent with assumptions A.3 and A.4
(recurrence) exposed in Hopenhayn (1992a), and are very important for the existence of
a stationary equilibrium with positive entry and exit.
15 All these implications of the simple structure of the matrix T we consider are consistent
with, although they do not imply, empirical regularities documented in Simon and Bonini
(1958), Caves (1998) and Dunne Roberts and Samuelson (1989).
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The aggregate production of the industry is:
Y s =
nX
i=1
zi
Z
B
K¡(zi; dK) (1)
Assumption 2. (i) Firms face adjustment costs of capital KC(u;m),
where u ´ ¡UK ¢ and m ´ ¡MK ¢.16 (ii)As expressed in Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2002a), assume that investment through mergers imply a positive …xed cost
(Á > 0) and a marginal adjustment cost activity lower than that with di-
rect purchase of new capital goods (c0u(u) > c0m(m)). (iii)Let Á ´ µnM ,
where nM is the number of acquired …rms and µ is a positive parameter.
In addition, µ is big enough to avoid …rms acquire more than one …rm per
period.
As a result, …rms have no limit to size due to constant average cost, but
they cannot grow in…nitely because of the costs of adjustment of capital
stock. Furthermore, in assumption 2 (iii) we want to capture the fact that
in reality, due to …xed production costs, it is more pro…table for a …rm to
invest in one big …rm than buying many small …rms in order to achieve a
given optimal investment level.
We also assume additive separability of the adjustment cost function:
C(u;m)K = Kt[IÁ + cm(mt)+ cu(ut)]; I =
½
1 if m > 0
0 if m = 0
(2)
In connection to this, Jovanovic and Rousseau de…ne i ´ u + m as the
gross investment rate and suggest that low-i …rms will avoid the cost Á by
setting u ¸ 0 and m = 0; while …rms with big expansions will set u ¸ 0 and
m > 0. The following equation expresses the per-unit-of-capital adjustment
and acquisition costs of m and u and determines the value of i¤ at which
…rms are indi¤erent between setting (u ¸ 0;m = 0) and (u ¸ 0;m > 0):
i¤+ cu(i¤) = Á + min
m
f(i¤¡ m) + qm + cm(i¤ ¡m) + cu(i¤)g (3)
The left hand side is the per-unit-of-capital adjustment and acquisition
costs related to direct purchase of new capital goods, and the right hand
side is the minimized per-unit-of-capital adjustment and acquisition costs of
expansions through combinations of u and m. The left hand side is lower
16 This is a standard convex cost of adjustment, increasing, di¤erentiable function ho-
mogeneous of degree one in K;E and M .
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when i is small, and the right hand side is lower when i is high, as it is
shown in …gure 1.
Figure 1 also shows the upward jump in the investment composition
while i is rising. The black curve and the black dashing curve indicate the
per-unit-of-capital cost of expansions through u exclusively, and through u
and m, respectively. The grey line shows the evolution of u, while the grey
dashing line corresponds to m. The …gure shows that small expansions come
exclusively through u while great expansions show combinations of u and m
where the share of m is increasing in i.
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Figure 1.
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a) document that this indi¤erence point
has fallen over time, and they suggest that a decline in the parameter Á
explains this fact. Our paper provides a more detailed framework in order
to analyze an alternative theoretical explanation, keeping Á constant over
time.
Incumbent …rms maximize expected discounted pro…ts and accumulate
capital according to Kt+1 = (1¡ ±)Kt +Ut +Mt: The optimization problem
of the …rm is:
L = Vt(zt;Pt; Kt) = maxfUt+sg1s=0fMt+sg1s=0
¼t + Et
" 1X
s=1
¯t+s¡1¼t+s
#
(4)
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where
¼t = fPtzKt ¡Kt[IÁ + cm(mt) + cu(ut)] ¡ Ut ¡ qMtg (5)
subject to
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + Ut +Mt (6)
This problem can be rewritten in a recursive fashion where …rms maxi-
mize the expected discounted value of dividends given the possibility to exit
the industry (getting s per unit of capital).17
Vt(z
i
t ;Pt; Kt) = KtQt(z
i
t; Pt) = max
U¸0;M¸0
fPtzitKt ¡ Kt[IÁ + cm(mt) + cu(ut)]
¡Ut ¡ qMt + [Kt(1 ¡ ±) +Ut + Mt]Q¤tg (7)
where
Q¤t (z
i
t; Pt) = ¯t
X
j
maxfs; Qt+1(zjt+1;Pt+1)gTij (8)
and i; j = 1;2; ::::; n; and Ti;j is the i; j element of T:
Incumbent …rms decide whether to exit or to stay in the industry be-
fore next period’s shock is revealed. In equilibrium …rms exit the industry
whenever z falls below a reservation value zx, as exposed in Hopenhyan
(1992a).
zxt = inf
8<:zi 2 S : X
j
Qt+1(z
j
t+1;Pt+1)Tij ¸ s
9=; (9)
This boundary zxt is the lowest level of productivity that will enable the
…rm to have, over future periods, positive discounted expected pro…ts. We
assume that …rm exit decisions does not depend on q because of myopia.
They do not go to the market for corporate control until they fail. Then,
they base their exit decisions only on s. This assumption avoid us dealing
with possible mergers between incumbent …rms, which would complicate
considerably the analysis.
We have shown that …rm value is linear in K, and that …rm survival
depends on z but not on K . Then, it can also be shown that:
17 As output function and capital adjustment cost are homogeneous of degree one in
K; M and E, the aggregation condition of Hayashi and Inoue holds and then …rm’s value
is lineal in K; that is V (zt ;Pt; Kt) = KtQ(zt; Pt), and …rm’s value per unit of capital
Q(zt; Pt) does not depend on …rm’s capital level (see the citation of Hayashi and Inoue
(1991) in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a) for details).
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Proposition 2 The average size of …rms in a given age cohort increases
over time.18
Proof. Let yh denote the output of …rms in a given cohort of age h; net
the mass of entrants in period t and ½h the proportion of …rms in the cohort
that are still in the industry after t periods,
½h =
nX
i=x
( i¸)
hgi
where gi is the i element of the vector g of initial probabilities. Notice that
½h is decreasing in x. The average size of …rms in a given age cohort h > 0
is
yh =
nX
i=x
(¸i)
hgiz
i
Z
B
K¡(zi; dK)
nX
i=x
( i¸)hgi
and, consequently, proposition 1(i) implies that yj is increasing with the age
of a cohort.
Assumption 3. All potential entrants have a the same wealth level
W<Ke and have to borrow (Ke ¡ W) to …nance their business project, at
the interest rate re. And we de…ne Ce = W +(Ke ¡ W )(1 + re):
Hence, the start-up capital requirements constitutes a cost of entry be-
cause entrepreneurs must …nance greater amounts than incumbents and the
cost of capital is higher for entrants than for incumbents because of the
interest rate re:19 This can be thought as a reduced form representation of
capital market imperfections (a problem of asymmetric information about
entrepreneurs’ survival probabilities), then expensive loans are granted to
new …rms.
We assume that entering capital takes a period to become active. New
…rms will enter the industry until their expected discounted value is equal
18 This is another empirical fact documented in Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989).
19 Cooley and Quadrini (1998) present empirical evidence that small and younger …rms
take on more debt. To simplify, we assume that incumbent …rms have current pro…ts big
enough to cover the total costs of the e¢cient investment rate according to zi:
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to the cost of entry Ce. Their expected discounted value is:
V et (Pt) = K
e¯
X
i
maxfs; Qt+1(zit+1;Pt+1)ggi ¡ [
Cez }| {
W + (Ke ¡W )(1 + re)]
(10)
The evolution of the number of …rms in the industry is given by the
following law of motion:X
z
Z
B
¡t+1(z
i; dK) =
X
j
X
i>x
Tij
Z
B
¡t(z
i; dK) +net (11)
More speci…cally, the left hand side express the mass of …rms in period
t + 1. The right hand side is the number of incumbent surviving …rms plus
new entrants.
De…ning the transition operator P 0x for the exit rule zx in the same way
as in Hopenhayn (1992a), the law of motion of the number of …rms expressed
in matricial notation is de…ned as20:
¡t+1 = P
0
x¡t + n
e
tg (12)
We have assumed that shocks are positively autocorrelated. Thus, this
fact let us derive the following result.
Proposition 3 (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001a) If the z shocks are pos-
itively autocorrelated, then …rm’s investment is increasing in z and large
…rms tend to grow faster.
Proof. See Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001a), proposition 1 and corollary
2.
The intuition is simple. If z is positively autocorrelated, the right-hand
side of (8) depends on z and from the …rst order conditions21 M and U
are increasing in z: Therefore, as Q(zt; Pt) is increasing in z, high-z …rms
will show the largest expansions. In addition, higher-z …rms will tend to be
larger.
20 See appendix 7.1 for details.
21 See appendix 7.2 for details.
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4 Stationary equilibrium.
In this section we characterize the stationary equilibrium concept as devel-
oped by Hopenhayn (1992a). Given any distribution of …rms ¡t there exist a
unique aggregate output Yt and prices P¤t (¡t) and q¤t (¡t) that satisfy market
clearing condition for goods P ¤t = D(Y st (¡¤t ;P¤t (¡¤t )); and market clearing
conditions for bundled and unbundled capital goods:
q¤t = D
M
0@ nX
i=x
Mt
Z
B
¡t(z
i; dK)
1A ; 1 = DU
0@ nX
i=x
Ut
Z
B
¡t(z
i; dK)
1A
where DM and DU are inverse demand functions for …rms in the acqui-
sition market and for new capital goods, respectively. In addition, the sta-
tionary equilibrium for the industry can be de…ned by the condition ¡t = ¡¤,
where the following equations must be satis…ed:X
j
Qt+1(z
j
t+1;¡
¤)Tij = s with i = x (13)
Ket
(
¯
X
i
maxfs; Qt+1(zit+1;¡¤)ggi
)
= Ce (14)
¡¤ = ne¤(1 ¡ Px¤ )¡1g (15)
[c0u(ut) +1] = ¯tEt
£
max
©
s;
£
Pt+1zt+1+ C
K(¢) + (1 ¡ ±)(c0u(ut+1) + 1)
¤ª¤
(16)
[c0m(mt)+q] = ¯tEt
£
max
©
s;
£
Pt+1zt+1 +C
K(¢) + (1 ¡ ±)(c0m(mt+1) + q)
¤ª¤
(17)
Equation (13) implies that the exit rule is chosen optimally. Condition
(14) assures that new …rms will enter the industry until the expected dis-
counted value is equal to the cost of entry. The last two conditions (16)
and (17) are the Euler equations that characterize the optimal investment
decisions.22
Condition (15) is the stationary distribution of the number of …rms com-
ing from (12), and states that the distribution sequences are consistent with
22 See appendix 7.2 for details.
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the law of motion generated by the equilibrium exit rule and the mass of en-
trants, respectively. Based on this equation assume a measure¡ = R(zx; ne);
jointly continuous, decreasing in zx, and increasing in ne.23 As a result, con-
ditions (13) and (14) can be expressed as follows:
(exit rule)
X
j
Qt+1
³
zjt+1;R(z
x;ne1(x))
´
Tij = s with i = x (18)
(entry rule) Ket
(
¯
X
i
maxfs;Qt+1(zit+1;R(zx; ne2(x))ggi
)
= Ce (19)
Adding up, for an exit rule zxt ; we de…ne n
e
1 and n
e
2 as the number of
entrants needed so that the exit rule zx is optimal (equation 18), and the
expected discounted value of entrants is equal to the cost of entry (equation
19), respectively. Figure 2 portrays functions ne1 and n
e
2: For an exit rule
zxt ; the function Q(zt+1;R(z
x
t ;n
e
t (z
x
t )) has a maximum at z
n for all ne > 0;
where ne1(z
n) > ne2(z
n) from direct inspection of (18) and (19). Hopen-
hayn(1992a,b) establishes the conditions under which there exists a unique
stationary equilibrium (there exist a point such that ne1 < n
e
2; and curves n
e
1
and ne2 intersect only once):
24
23 For a proof see Lemmas 4 and 5 in Hopenhayn (1992a).
24 Basically, the existence of stationary equilibrium with positive entry and exit requires
the existence of a stopping rule with …nite expectation and a mass of entrants such that for
the stationary prices that correspond to the associated invariant distribution this stopping
rule is optimal and the expected discounted pro…ts of entrants are equal to the cost of
entry. See the appendix 7.3 for details.
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ne ne1
ne2
1
0
0                  zx
Figure 2. (From Hopenhayn, 1992a).
4.1 Equilibrium in the market for corporate control.
Based on our additional assumptions respect to Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2002a) model, in this section we present a detailed description of the market
for corporate control that, in contrast with Jovanovic and Rousseau, allow
us to characterize exiting …rms that are dissolved and exiting …rms that go
bankrupt and are acquired by successful incumbents.
The lowest level of productivity that enable the …rm to stay in busi-
ness is zx. Each period …rms with di¤erent levels of K and z < zx exit.
Hence, there is a measure of exiting …rms de…ned for each capital size and
this measure constitutes the supply of …rms in the acquisition market which
is endogenous because zx is endogenous. As a result, there is an endoge-
nous inelastic supply of assembled capital (target/exiting …rms) per period,
x¡1X
i=1
Kt
Z
B
¡(zi; dK) , as it is portrayed in …gure 3, quadrant 1, for each size
of capital.
Denote by zm the lowest e¢ciency level at which the …rm invest through
mergers. Furthermore, zm corresponds to the lowest productivity shock that
yields an investment rate i higher than the indi¤erence investment rate i¤ in
equation (3) (denoted by the vertical line in Figure 1), which is determined
by the adjustment cost function parameters and input prices. As the price
for new capital goods is determined competitively in the economy, while
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bundled capital goods are speci…c to the industry25 and are determined
competitively in the industry, the former is exogenous (and we normalized it
to 1) and the latter (q) is endogenous to the industry. The latter determines
the slope of the per-unit-of-capital cost curve (black dashing curve in …gure
1) of expansions through combinations of U and M: Therefore, q determines
the cuto¤ level zm and the mass of …rms entering the acquisition market.26
Then, it shapes the demand for corporate control.
Assuming an adjustment cost function cm(mt) = m2=2®, from the …rst
order condition27 we have the investment rate through m de…ned by m =
®[Q¤t (zi;P) ¡ q] that is portrayed in …gure 3, quadrant 3. In fact, there is
a map of parallel lines from that of the highest-z …rm (m(zn; q)) until the
less e¢cient …rm that show m > 0 (denoted by m(zm; q)).
Notice that M = mK . Hence, in quadrant 2 the graph re‡ects the
relation between m and M by a line which slope is the capital stock of the
…rm. At price q the largest and most e¢cient …rm has an investment rate
through m showed by point A and an absolute acquisition investment M
at point A0 which intersect the maximum capital stock line K.28 While a
…rm de…ned by a pair (zn;Ke) is situated at point A00. On the other hand,
zm¡…rms that have a maximum capital stock K < K (de…ned by the grey
dashing line) is situated at point B0, while …rms de…ned by the pair (zm;Ke)
are indicated in point B00.
Given a price q; the aggregate demand for corporate control is:
nX
i=x
Mt
Z
B
¡t(z
i; dK)
In quadrant 1, between points B000 and A000 (pointed out with an M); it
is shown the measure ¡(zi;K) with zn ¸ zi ¸ zm and Ke ¸ K ¸ K: It is
the number of …rms that constitutes the demand for corporate control, for
each size of capital, at a given price q.
25 If you want to sell bundled assets outside the industry you have to disassemble them.
26 To clarify, looking at …gure 1, a decrease in q leads to a lower slope of the black
dashing curve (the per-unit-of-capital cost of expansions through optimal combinations of
U and M). Then the rate of investment at which this curve intersects the black curve (the
per-unit-of-capital cost of expansions through U exclusively) decreases, leading to a lower
rate of investment i¤ (that corresponds to a lower zm shock) at which …rms are indi¤erent
between entering the acquisition market and staying out of it.
27 See equation (24) in appendix 7.2.
28 We de…ne K 2 B as the maximum capital stock a …rm can achieve given the maximum
…nite life span of a zn¡…rm, the initial …rm’s capital stock Ke and the adjustment cost
functions.
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In equilibrium, the demand for bundled capital goods (acquisitions), de-
…ned by the distribution of the number of …rms in the interval [B000;A000]; is
equal to the upper tail of the inelastic supply of target …rms per size (the
mass of bankrupt …rms).29 Furthermore, denote by DM the aggregate in-
verse acquisition demand function. Then, the expression for the acquisition
market clearing price condition is:
qt = D
M
0@ nX
i=x
Mt
Z
B
¡t(z
i; dK)
1A (20)
Then, looking at …gure 3, in equilibrium …rms with size in the interval
[B000; A000] are acquired, while those with size K < B000 are dissolved and get
s per unit of capital.
Mass of firms
1
dissolved
  exiting   exiting
firms firms
 q  B''' A'''
m(z
m
,q)  B   B'
B''
A'
  m(z
n
,q) A A''
K
3 2   e
K
m
  M
Kq
acquired
Figure 3.
29 In fact, there should be a sequence of prices qi determined by the relative shortage of
exiting …rm of each size. But in order to simplify we assume that the properties of the
stochastic process for shocks and the properties of the adjustment cost functions make
prices qi collapse to only one price (q). In other words, price q clear all these markets (the
market for corporate control for each size).
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As a result, large exiting …rms qualify30 to participate in the acquisition
market becoming target …rms (potential acquirees) that …nd the o¤ers from
acquirers to be higher than the scrap value s, while relative small …rms are
dissolved and get s per unit of capital.
5 Comparative statics.
In this section we analyze the e¤ect that changes in some relevant parameters
have on the stationary equilibrium above de…ned. In particular we make two
exercises according to our suggestion about the role that liquidity shocks
play on merger activity. We analyze the mechanism by which an increase in
aggregate liquidity may have an impact on investment through mergers.
A reduction in the entry cost, Ce. Assume that due to a "liquidity"
shock, the economy becomes more …nancially developed and the credit sup-
ply increase having a positive impact (a reduction) in the cost of capital re
of entrepreneurs. Figure 4 depicts the e¤ect of a decrease in Ce on the sta-
tionary equilibrium. As it is analyzed in Hopenhayn (1992a), a lower cost of
entry has a selection e¤ect and a price e¤ect. First, we examine the former.
Accordingly, by looking at equilibrium conditions (18) and (19) a decrease
in Ce shifts curve ne2 upwards. Entry must increase in order to balance the
discounted pro…ts of entrants with a lower Ce in equation (19). Since curve
ne1 is increasing this implies that the equilibrium z
x increases and so does
ne.
30 To reach a capital scale (exiting …rm size) according to the optimal investment level
through mergers that incumbent …rms are looking for at a given price q.
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ne1
ne2
2
1
0
0                  zx
Figure 4.
The increase in equilibrium zx and ne values implies an increase in the
intensity of market selection (higher turnover rate of …rms) because of the
lower barrier to entry of new …rms and because the higher zx increases the
exit rate. Then, a higher mass of …rms (in particular, a higher number
of large …rms) exit the industry, expanding the supply of target …rms in
the acquisition market (see the mass of exiting …rms -dashing curve- in
…gure 5, quadrant 1). Then, this excess of supply of target …rms induces a
negative change in q (the slope of the per-unit-of-capital cost curve -black
dashing curve of …gure 1- through optimal combinations of U and M) and, as
mentioned before, it determines a reduction in the cuto¤ level zm increasing
the mass of …rms entering the acquisition market.31 In addition, it changes
the composition of …rms’ investment increasing the share of mergers. A
fraction of …rms with lower shocks become acquirers, and this is re‡ected
by the dashing line in quadrant 3, …gure 5. Then, the least e¢cient …rm
with the lowest capital level Ke is located at point B2 in quadrant 1, while
more e¢cient acquirers increase their investment scale through mergers (for
31 As it was mentioned in the previous section, by looking at equation 3 and …gure 1, a
decrease in q leads to a lower rate of investment i¤ (that corresponds to a lower zm shock)
at which …rms are indi¤erent between entering the acquisition market and staying out of
it.
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example, …rms de…ned by the pair (zn; K) is now situated at point A2):
 Mass of firms
1
dissolved
  exiting   exiting
firms firms
 q q' B2  B1 A1    A2
new acquirers
A'
A
K
  e
3 2 K
m
acquired
K
B
q
Figure 5.
But there is also a price e¤ect:32 output price decreases with the lower
Ce leading to a reduction in Q(zi;P) and m:
The net e¤ect depends on the strength of each of these e¤ects that are de-
termined by the properties of the stochastic process for idiosyncratic shocks.
By proposition 1(iii) we know that due to the skewed frequency distribution
of …rm e¢ciencies the elasticity of exit rate to a positive change in zx (that
represents an expansion of the acquisition market supply) is higher than the
elasticity of the (lower) measure of acquirers (demand for acquisitions) to a
positive change in zm (due to a reduction in the output price).33 Then, it can
be thought as if there are more …rms exiting and approximately the same
number of acquirers. In addition, in the market for corporate control the
32 By looking at equation (19), if Ce decreases, to match the lower entry cost discounted
pro…ts need to be lower. Then, the long run output price must decrease. See Hopenhayn
(1992a), pp. 1142 for details.
33 A reduction in the output price leads to lower Q(zi; P). Hence, the investment rate of
all …rms decreases. Then, a higher shock zm corresponds to the same i¤ (rate of investment
at which …rms are indi¤erent between entering the acquisition market and staying out of
it).
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demand elasticity is higher than that of the supply (that, as we mentioned
before, is inelastic). Then, a simultaneous inelastic supply expansion with
a demand contraction leads to more mergers at lower prices (q).
As a result, a reduction in the cost of entry, Ce, leads to higher turnover
rate that induces a decline in q and an increase in mergers.
An increase in the outside industry opportunity cost, s. Assume there
is an increase in the opportunity cost s: For example, outside opportunities
may rise because of a liquidity shock that reduces the cost of entry in other
industries, increasing the mobility of resources among di¤erent markets.
Hence, according to equations (18) and (19), the curve ne1 shifts down-
wards (to match the higher opportunity cost, s, discounted pro…ts must rise
in order to keep incumbent …rms indi¤erent between exiting and staying in
the industry) resulting in higher values for zx and ne: As in the previous
case, this would imply a higher rate of turnover. The increase in zx induces
a larger proportion of …rms to fail leading to an expansion in the inelastic
supply for each size of target …rms in the acquisition market (again, this
is re‡ected by the higher mass of exiting …rms -dashing curve- in …gure 5,
quadrant 1). Therefore, more high-capital …rms qualify to participate in the
acquisition market becoming potential acquirees. Then, price q drops down.
In contrast with the previous case, there is no e¤ect on output price
because all parameters in equation (19) remain the same. Then, as in the
previous case, a reduction in q determines a fall in the cuto¤ level zm that
changes the composition of …rms’ investment increasing the share of mergers
and increasing the mass of …rms entering the acquisition market: Therefore,
a proportion of …rms with lower shocks become acquirers (as it is pointed
out by the dashing line in quadrant 3, …gure 5) and all acquirer …rms invest
more through M . As a result, the number and scale of mergers increases.
Adding up, as it was shown in the previous comparative static exercises,
in our model merger waves are likely to be driven by aggregate liquidity
shocks.
6 Final Remarks.
We develop a theoretical model within which to study factors a¤ecting vari-
ables such as entry, exit and investment through direct unbundled capital
good purchase and mergers. The model we build is an extension of a modi-
…ed version of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) model that introduces …nan-
cial frictions, describes the market for corporate control and endogenizes
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its equilibrium price, and develops a stationary equilibrium à la Hopenhayn
(1992).
The simple theoretical framework developed in this paper is just an at-
tempt to provide an alternative explanation in order to help to understand
some aspects of the complex reality. So, the distance between the real econ-
omy and our results are proportional to the quantity and quality of all
assumptions made in our model. Notwithstanding, as far as there is no the-
oretical explanation for the questions expressed in this context from which
di¤erent results will be obtained, the conclusions found are considered to be
worthy.
This work contributes to the literature by providing a uni…ed frame-
work where the turnover rate of …rms and mergers processes are codeter-
mined, suggesting another explanation to many empirical regularities and
describing one more mechanism through which aggregate liquidity shocks
may a¤ect merger activity. The results suggest that due to asymmetric
information about entrepreneur’s survival probabilities aggregate liquidity
shocks contribute to codetermine the turnover rate of …rms and investment
levels through mergers.
Empirical evidence suggests that economies became more …nancially de-
veloped in the last decades34 leading to an improvement in the matching ef-
…ciency between risky investors and entrepreneurs. As a result, the sources
of …nancial capital for entrepreneurs have grown. In our model this phe-
nomenon (a fall in entrepreneurs …nancing costs) leads to a reduction in
the costs of entry increasing the turnover rate of …rms and mergers activ-
ity. Furthermore, it provides an alternative theoretical explanation to the
evidenced increase in merger activity and the change in …rms’ investment
composition over the past two decades. Merger waves are likely to be driven
by aggregate liquidity shocks.
34 See Damodaran (1999) and E¤enberg (2003).
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7 Appendix.
7.1 Law of motion of the number of …rms.
In order to save space, consider the special case of n = 4. Assume z 2
S ´ fz1; z2; z3; z4g;with z1 < z2 < zx < z3 < z4. Then, equation (12) is
expressed as follows:0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
Z
B
¡t+1(z
4; dK)Z
B
¡t+1(z3; dK)Z
B
¡t+1(z
2; dK)Z
B
¡t+1(z1; dK)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
¡t+1
=
0BB@
¸4 0 0 0
0 ¸3 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 ¡ ¸4 1 ¡ ¸3 0 0
1CCA
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
Z
B
¡t(z
4; dK)Z
B
¡t(z3; dK)Z
B
¡t(z
2; dK)Z
B
¡t(z1; dK)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
| {z }
P 0x¡t
+
nt
0BB@
g4
g3
g2
g1
1CCA
| {z }
ntg
where the number of incumbent …rms that survive in period t+1,
P 0x¡t; is derived from the following fact:
(P 0x¡t)
0 = ¡0tPx =Ã Z
B
¡t(z4; dK)
Z
B
¡t(z3; dK)
Z
B
¡t(z2; dK)
Z
B
¡t(z1; dK)
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¸4 0 0 1 ¡¸4
0 ¸3 0 1 ¡¸3
0 0 0 0
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7.2 Demand for capital, Tobin’s Marginal Q and Euler equa-
tions.
In this section we derive the …rst order conditions of the incumbent …rm’s
problem. From the Bellman equation we have:
ut : [c
0
u(ut) +1] ¡ Q¤t = 0 (21)
mt : [c
0
m(mt) + q] ¡ Q¤t = 0 (22)
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From the …rst order conditions one can derive the demands for equipment
and mergers:
ut = c
0
u[(Q
¤
t ¡ 1)]¡1 (23)
mt = c
0
m[(Q
¤
t ¡ q)]¡1 (24)
We de…ne a proxy Tobin’s Marginal Q (measured at the end of period
t or at the beginning of period t + 1) as the increase in …rms’ value (in
period t +1) that would result from an additional unit of installed capital,
Qt =
¡
@V
@K
¢
t+1 : The envelope condition is:³
@V (z;P;K)
@K
´
t
= Qt¡1 =
fPtzt¡[IÁ + cm(mt) + cu(ut)] + M
K
c0m(mt) +
U
K
c0u(ut)| {z }
CK(:)
g + (1 ¡ ±)Q¤t (25)
This equation one period ahead is:
Qt = fPt+1zt+1+ CK(¢)g + (1 ¡ ±)Q¤t+1 (26)
Combining this equation and the FOCs to eliminate Qt and Q¤t from
equation (14) Q¤t (¢) = ¯t
P
j
maxfs; Qt+1(¢)gTij , yields the Euler equations:
[c0u(ut)+ 1] =
¯t
X
j
max
n
s;
h
Pt+1z
j
t+1+ C
K(¢) + (1 ¡ ±)(c0u(ut+1) + 1)
io
Tij (27)
[c0m(mt) + q] =
¯t
X
j
max
n
s;
h
Pt+1z
j
t+1 +C
K(¢) + (1 ¡ ±)(c0m(mt+1) + q)
io
Tij (28)
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7.3 Existence of equilibrium with positive entry and exit.35
In order to guarantee an equilibrium with positive entry and exit so that the
equilibrium price remains constant over time, we need to make an additional
assumption.
Assumption 3. The sequence ½hyh is decreasing with the age h of a
…rm cohort.
Then, the total output of a cohort of …rms of age h that entered into the
industry in period t is net½hyh: According to assumption 3 the contribution
to the total production of a given cohort of …rms decreases over time.36
As V e(¢) is strictly increasing in P , in equilibrium there is a unique price
P¤ so that V e(P¤) = Ce; and a given sequence of entries that satis…es the
following equation for the total output of the industry:
Yt = n
e
t
nX
i=1
ziKegi +
t¡1X
h=0
neh½hyt¡h (29)
The …rst term on the right hand side is the entrant’s output contribution
to the industry production, and the second term is the incumbent’s output
contribution to the industry production, both in period t.
By assumption 3 ½hyh is a decreasing sequence, then we have:
t¡1X
h=0
neh½hyt¡h <
t¡1X
h=0
neh½hyt¡h¡1 = Yt¡1 (30)
Adding up, given that P ¤ satis…es the condition V e(P¤) = Ce; and given
stationarity Yt = Yt¡1; every period the production of incumbent …rms is
not big enough to equal demand at this equilibrium price, so there is room
for entrants to supply this production gap, and this guarantees that net > 0
8t and thus the equilibrium is interior.
35 This section is an adaptation of Hopenhayn (1993).
36 This assumption is consistent with empirical regularity (see Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson, 1989a).
25
References
[1] Andrade G. and Sta¤ord E. (2002). “Investigating the Economic Role
of Mergers.”, Journal of Corporate Finance, 161, pp. xxx-xxx.
[2] Asplund and Nocke (2003). “Firm Turnover and Imperfectly Competi-
tive Markets.”, mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.
[3] Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly and Kattuman (2004). “Macroeconomic
Conditions and Business Exit: Determinants of Failure and Acquisi-
tions of UK Firms.”, DAE Working Paper 0206, Department of Applied
Economics, University of Cambridge.
[4] Cabral Luís (1995). “Sunk Costs, Firm Size and Firm Growth.”, The
Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume XLIII, pp.161-172.
[5] Cooley Thomas and Quadrini Vicenzo (1998) “Financial Markets and
Firm Dynamics.”, American Economic Review, 91, pp. 2186-1310.
[6] Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003). “Entry, Exit and Establishment Sur-
vival in UK Manufacturing.”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 51, pp.
91-112.
[7] Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989a). “Patterns of Firm Entry and
Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries.”, Rand Journal of Economics,
19, pp. 495-515.
[8] Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989b). “The Growth and Failure of
US Manufacturing Plants.”, Quaterly Journal of Economics, 96, pp.
671-698.
[9] Dirk E¤enberg (2003). “Credit Derivatives: Implications for Credit
Markets.”, Deutsche Bank Research, International Topics.
[10] Ericson R. and Pakes A. (1995). “Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics: A
Framework for Empirical Work.”, Review of Economic Studies, pp.53-
82.
[11] Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). “Financing Constraints and
Corporate Investment.”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1,
pp.141-206.
[12] Gort Michael (1969) “An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers.”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 83, pp. 624-642.
26
[13] Gort M. and Klepper Steven, (1982) “Time Paths in the Di¤usion of
Product Innovations.”, Economic Journal, 92, pp. 630-653.
[14] Gort, Grabowski and McGunkin (1985) “Organization Capital and the
Choice Between Specialization and Diversi…cation.”, Managerial Deci-
sion Economics, 6, pp. 2-10.
[15] Hayashi Fumio (1982). “Tobin’s Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclas-
sical Interpretation.”, Econometrica, 50, No. 1, pp. 213-224.
[16] Hayashi Fumio and Inoue Tohru (1991). “The Relation Between Firm
Growth and Q with MultipleCapital Goods: Theory and Evidence from
Panel Data on Japanese Firms.”, Econometrica, 59(3), pp. 731-753.
[17] Hopenhayn Hugo (1992a). “Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long
Run Equilibrium.”, Econometrica, 60(5), pp. 1127-1150.
[18] Hopenhayn Hugo (1992b). “Exit, Selection and The Value of Firms.”,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 16, pp. 621-653.
[19] Hopenhayn Hugo (1993). “The Shakeout.”, Universitat Pompeu Fabra,
Economics Working Paper 33.
[20] Hopenhayn Hugo and Rogerson Richard (1993). “Job Turnover and Pol-
icy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis.”, Journal of Political
Economy 101, pp. 915-938.
[21] Jensen M. (1993). “The modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and Con-
trol Systems.", Journal of Finance, 48, pp. 831-880.
[22] Jovanovic B. (1982). “Selection and the Evolution of Industry.”, Econo-
metrica, 50, pp. 649-670.
[23] Jovanovic B. (1998). “Michael Gort’s Contribution to Economics.”, Re-
view of Economic Dynamics, 1, pp. 327-337.
[24] Jovanovic B. and Rousseau P. (2001a) “Mergers and Technological
Change: 1885-1998.”, mimeo, NYU.
[25] Jovanovic B. and Rousseau P. (2001b) “Vintage Organization Capital.”,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Working Pa-
per No. 8166.
27
[26] Jovanovic B. and Rousseau P. (2002a). “The Q-Theory of Mergers.”,
American Economic Review, 82, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings, pp.
198-204.
[27] Jovanovic B. and Rousseau P. (2002b). “Mergers as Reallocation.”, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Working Paper
No. 9279.
[28] Klepper (1996), “Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation over the Product
Life Cycle.”, The American Economic Review, Volume 86, No. 3, pp.
562-583.
[29] Lambson V. and Jensen F. (1998), “Sunk Costs and Firm Value Vari-
ability: Theory and Evidence.”, The American Economic Review, Vol-
ume 88, No. 1, pp.307.
[30] Lambson V. and Jensen F. (1995), “Sunk Costs and the Variability
of Firm Value over time.”, The Review of Economics and Statistics,
Volume 77, issue 3, August 1995.
[31] Lucas R. (1978). “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms.”, Bell
Journal of Economics, 9, pp. 508-523.
[32] Lucas R. and Prescott E. (1971). “Investment under uncertainty.”,
Econometrica, 39, pp.659-81.
[33] Ljungqvist L. and Sargent T. (2000). “Recursive Macroeconomic The-
ory.”, The MIT Press.
[34] Manne Henry (1965). “Mergers and theMarket for CorporateControl.”,
Journal of Political Economy 73, No. 2, pp. 110-120.
[35] Mitchell M. and Mulherin J. (1996). “The Impact of Industry Shocks
on Takeover and Restructuring Activity.”, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 41, pp. 193-229.
[36] Pakes A.and Ericson R. (1998). “Empirical Implications of Alternative
Models of Firm Dynamics.”, Journal of Economic Theory, pp.1-45.
[37] Pautler Paul (2001). “Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions.”, Bureau
of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
[38] Peel M. and Wilson N. (1989). “Some Evidence on Discriminating Be-
tween Failing and Distressed Acquired Firms in the UK Corporate Sec-
tor.”, Managerial and Decision Economics, 10, pp. 209-220.
28
[39] Servaes Henry (1991). “Tobin’s Q and the Gains from Takeovers.”,
Journal of Finance, 46, No. 1, pp.409-416.
[40] Schary M.A.(1991). “The Probability of Exit.”, Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics, 22, pp. 339-353.
[41] Simon H. E. and Bonini C. P. (1958) “The Size Distribution of Business
Firms.”, American Economic Review, 48, 607-617.
[42] Stokey N., Lucas R. and Prescott E. (1989) “Recursive Methods in
Economic Dynamics.”, Harvard University Press.
[43] Sutton John (1997) “The Gibrat’s Legacy.”, Journal of Economic Lit-
erature, 35, pp. 40-59.
[44] Wynne Jose (2005) “The Value of Information in Credit Markets.”,
mimeo, Duke University, Fuqua School of Business.
29
